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I. INTRODUCTION
One of the most versatile tools the business planner has at his dis-
posal is the limited partnership with a corporate general partner. Basi-
cally, the partnership consists of a corporate general partner with limited
partners who may or may not own stock in the general partner. Occa-
sionally, there is a non-corporate general partner as well. The advantages
of this entity become especially apparent in the areas of real estate
investment and development.1 In most instances, it is desirable for the cor-
poration to hold title to the land and then contribute it to the limited part-
nership. Under such an arrangement, dower laws which often restrict alien-
ability of land are circumvented.2 Since state usury laws generally permit
lending institutions to charge higher interest rates to corporations, 3 finan-
cing often unavailable to individuals becomes available to the corporation.
From an investor's viewpoint, the limited liability of stock ownership
is often preferable to the unlimited liability of general partnership. How-
ever, notwithstanding the advantages of the corporate form of doing busi-
ness, the limited partnership offers several advantages. The limited part-
ners enjoy the same limited liability as stockholders as long as state laws
on limited partnership are followed. The limited partnership agreement
has flexibility not found in the articles of incorporation or corporate by-
laws in that the partnership agreement can consider the nature of the
assets contributed to the limited partnership and allocate items of income
* J.D., University of Pitsburgh School of Law (1969); LL.M. in Taxation, Univ. of
Miami School of Law (1971) ; member of the Pennsylvania and Florida Bars.
1. For a discussion of the tax advantages of this type of entity see Hall, Use of a Lim-
ited Partnership to Invest in Depreciable Realty, 21 MERCER L. REV. 481 (1970); McGuire,
Limited Partnership: Steps That Can Be Taken to Overcome Problems in the Area, 34 J. OF
TAXATIoN 235 (1971).
2. See FLA. STAT. § 731.34 (1969), which permits a widow to elect to take one-third of
the property owned by her husband at death. Corporate ownership of the land would allevi-
ate this problem.
3. In Florida, the legal interest rate with regard to loans to individuals is 10% and is
15% to corporations. FLA. STAT. § 687.03 (1969).
4. Section 7 of the Uniform Limited Partnership Act provides that: "A limited partner
shall not become liable as a general partner unless, in addition to the exercise of his rights
and powers as a limited partner, he takes part in control of the business."
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and expense in a manner responsive to the contributions of the several
partners, both limited and general.' Such an allocation is contingent on
the limited partnership being treated as a partnership for tax purposes,
as opposed to an association. In the past, the Internal Revenue Service
had generally issued revenue rulings granting the desired partnership
taxation characterization to the limited partnership. In late 1969, however,
the Bureau of National Affairs began to publish "Tidbits" which sug-
gested that the Service had become extremely unwilling to continue to
issue favorable rulings.' As a consequence thereof, business planners began
to use alternative methods of obtaining the desired results in order to
avoid potential tax litigation. It is submitted that careful planning Will
attenuate the threat of an attack by the Service on a limited partnership
with a corporate general partner.
II. THE EFFECT OF STATE LAW
The propriety of a corporation entering into a limited partnership
must be determined under applicable state law. The Uniform Partnership
Act provides that a partnership is an association of two or more persons
to carry on business for a profit,7 and that a person is an individual, part-
nership, corporation or other association.8 Although the Uniform Limited
Partnership Act does not specify whether a corporation may be a partner,
the UPA applies to the ULPA to the extent that the latter remains con-
sistent with the formerY The two acts, when read together, do not seem
to prohibit a corporation from becoming a partner, either limited or gen-
eral. Traditionally, state corporation law had prohibited a corporation
from entering into a partnership on the theory that the authority of the
board of directors would be substantially curtailed due to the agency
relationship among the members of a partnership.'" However, Florida
corporation laws specifically enable a corporation to become either a gen-
eral or limited partner."
III. THE "UNOFFICIAL" ANNOUNCED POSITION OF THE SERVICE
Presumably, the Service waited until 1969 to initiate its assault on
the limited partnerships since an earlier assault would have been incon-
sistent with its position with regard to professional associations. The pro-
fessional association or "P.A." cases dealt with law firms and medical
5. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 704(a). The regulations under § 704 should be examined
in order to prevent allocations having no economic substance whose sole purposes are the
avoidance or evasion of tax. INT. REV. CODE of 1954 § 704(b) (2).
6. See notes 17, 19, 20, 23, 24 and 25 infra and accompanying text.
7. UNIFORM PARTNERsrnp ACT Part II § 6(1) (hereinafter cited as UPA).
8. UPA Part I § 2.
9. UPA Part II § 6(2).
10. For a discussion of a corporation's common law right to be a partner see Arm-
strong, Can Corporations Be Partners?, 20 BusneEss LAwYER 899 (1965).
11. Fr.A. STAT. § 608.13(18) (1969).
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offices which incorporated in compliance with state professional corpora-
tion laws. 12 The Service lost an early battle in a case involving a group
of professionals which complied with regulations governing corporate
taxation even though there was no state law which permitted professional
corporations. 3 Subsequent to this decision, the Service enacted a group
of regulations pertaining particularly to professional associations,' 4 but
these regulations were held to be discriminatory,15 and ultimately the
Service acquiesced and abandoned its attack on professional associations.'"
It would have been tactical suicide for the Service to have initiated
its attack on limited partnerships while the "P.A." cases were still in liti-
gation because of the dichotomous positions involved. In the former in-
stance, the organizations were being denied corporate tax treatment,
even though there was compliance with the Treasury's own regulations.
In the later instance, organizations were threatened with corporate tax
treatment, even though the regulations pertaining to limited partnerships
had been met.'"
Prior to 1969, the Service had generally granted partnership status
to limited partnerships with corporate general partners. In the latter part
of that year, the Service evidenced a singular determination to prevent
the continued benefit of partnership taxation to limited partnerships with
corporate general partners unless those partnerships conformed to cer-
tain tests which were mentioned in the Bureau of National Affairs "Tid-
bits."'
The initial release,° merely stated that for federal income tax pur-
poses the Service would not issue a ruling on the qualification of a limited
partnership as a partnership where the sole general partner was a corpo-
ration in which any one of the limited partners was also a shareholder
of the corporate general partner. Presumably, this position would extend
to situations in which an officer or director of the corporation owns no
stock in the corporation, but is a limited partner.
The Service then indicated that it would rule favorably,21 if the lim-
ited partners owned less than 20 percent of the outstanding stock of the
corporate general partner. But there would be no ruling where a limited
partner was a director or officer of the corporate general partner.
22
A subsequent release suggested that the Service would rule favor-
12. See generally Reich, Alternatives to the Professional Service Corporation, 28 N.Y.U.
TAX. INST. 1173 (1970).
13. United States v. Kinter, 216 F.2d 418 (9th Cir. 1954).
14. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(h) (1965).
15. Kurzner v. United States, 413 F.2d 97 (5th Cir. 1969)
16. Rev. Rul. 70-101, 1970-1 Cum. BULL. 278.
17. See note 13, supra.
18. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-3(b) (1960).
19. Hereinafter referred to as "Tidbits."
20. Tax Management Memorandum 69-05, Tidbit # 1.
21. A favorable ruling is, for the purposes of this discussion, one in which the Service
will consent to taxing the limited partnership as a partnership.
22. Tax Management Memorandum 69-08, Tidbit # 1.
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ably where the officers or directors of the corporate general partner held
limited partnership interests not exceeding 20 percent of all of the interests
in the partnership, provided that the officers or directors did not own
stock in the corporate general partner or an affiliated corporation as de-
fined under the SEC rules dealing with affiliated groups.ns
The Service then decided to use the rules of section 15042 of the
Internal Revenue Code in determining what would constitute an affiliated
group. The attribution rules of section 318 of the Code 25 would also be
applied in determining if the stock is owned directly or indirectly by the
limited partners.2"
The IRS next indicated that a limited partnership would be given
a favorable ruling only if the net worth on the books of the corporate
general partner was at least $250,000 or 10 percent of the capitalization
of the limited partnership, whichever was greater. If there was more
than one general partner, the net worths may be combined. This test
is said to be a general test which is applied even if the limited partner-
ship does not have continuity of life, centralized management, or free
transferability of interests.' The net worth test was modified to elim-
inate the flat $250,000 or 10 percent requirement so that the corporation
needed a net worth equal to 15 percent of the partnership capital if the
capital was less than $1,666,667, and 10 percent if the partnership capital
exceeded $2,500,000. A sliding scale would be used if the capitalization
fell between these two parameters.28
The most recent unofficial report indicated that both the 20 percent
ownership test and the net worth test must be met in order for a favorable
ruling to be forthcoming.29 A Letter Ruling issued on May 18, 1971, sup-
ports the position that the Service does indeed plan to follow the criteria
in the unofficial releases mentioned.80 On the other hand, all of the above
23. Tax Management Memorandum 69-19, Tidbit #1.
24. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 1504 basically refers to brother-sister corporations with
80% common control.
25. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 318(b) specifically provides that its attribution rules will
apply only where explicitly invoked by statute. Therefore, the propriety of using § 318 is
highly suspect.
26. Tax Management Memorandum 69-21, Tidbit # 1.
27. Tax Management Memorandum 69-26, Tidbit #3.
28. Tax Management Memorandum 70-10, Tidbit #1.
29. Point to remember #10, 24 TAX LAWYER 605 (1971).
30. The following is a reprint of the relevant portions of the letter ruling, as was ini-
tially given to the Prentice-Hall Tax Service.
In accordance with your request I enclose herewith a portion of a private
ruling issued by the Internal Revenue Service on May 18, 1971, holding that the
organization to whom the ruling was issued qualified as a limited partnership sub-
ject to certain conditions. The enclosed language is a verbatim extract of the
conditions imposed by the Service on said organization's continued status as a lim-
ited partnership for tax purposes.
I trust you will find this information useful. [Letter to Prentice-Hall, Inc.]
Conditions Excerpted from Letter Ruling
1. That the investing limited partners will not own directly or indirectly, indi-
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releases appear to be totally inconsistent with a letter this author re-
ceived from the Internal Revenue Service.3 '
IV. THE SERVICE'S OFFICIAL POSITION AS STATED IN THE REGULATIONS
Prior to these releases, the Service's position with regard to limited
partnerships was thought to be categorically specified in the regulations.
A limited partnership would be treated as a partnership for tax purposes,
unless using the principles set forth in Treasury Regulation section
301.7701-2 (1960), the organization more clearly resembled a corporation
than a partnership. 2 In order to more clearly resemble a corporation,
the organization must have at least three of the four corporate character-
istics which were initially articulated in Morrissey v. Commissionere3 and
have subsequently been adopted by the Treasury.84 The four character-
istics considered are continuity of life, free transferability of interests,
centralized management and limited liability. Two of the four, continuity
of life and free transferability of interests, are basically creatures of con-
tract law, thus, their non-existence can be insured by proper drafts-
manship.
If the death, retirement, or insanity of a general partner of a limited
partnership causes the dissolution of the partnership, continuity of life
vidually or in the aggregate, more than 20 percent of the stock of the corporate
general partner or any of its affiliates as defined in section 1504(a) of the Code.
2. If the corporate general partner has an interest in only one limited partner-
ship and the total contributions to that partnership are less than $2,500,000, the net
worth of the corporate general partner at all times will be at least 15 percent of
such total contributions of $250,000, whichever is the lesser; if the total contribu-
tions to that partnership are $2,500,000 or more, the net worth of the corporate
general partner at all times will be at least 10 percent of such total contributions.
In computing the net worth of the corporate general partner, for this purpose, its
interest in the limited partnership and accounts and notes receivable from and pay-
able to the limited partnership will be excluded.
3. If the corporate general partner has interests in more than one limited
partnership, the net worth requirements explained in the preceding paragraph will
be applied separately for each limited partnership, and the corporate general part-
ner will have at all pertinent times (exclusive of any interest in any limited partner-
ship and notes and accounts receivable from and payable to any limited partnership
in which the corporate general partner has any interest) a net worth at least as
great as the sum of the amounts required under (2) above for each separate
limited partnership.
31. The following excerpt is from a letter dated April 28, 1971, written to the author
from Lester W. Utter, Chief, Individual Income Tax Branch:
This is in reply to your letter of February 17, 1971 in which you request infor-
mation and ask certain questions concerning the classification of limited partnerships
for Federal income tax purposes.
The Internal Revenue Code prescribes certain categories, or classes, into which
various organizations fall for purposes of taxation. These categories, or classes,
include associations (which are taxable as corporations), partnerships, and trusts.
The tests, or standards, which are to be applied in determining the classification in
which an organization belongs (whether it is an association, a partnership, a trust,
or other taxable entity) are determined under the Internal Revenue Code. Sections
301.7701-2 through 301.7701-4 set forth these tests, or standards.
32. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-3(b) (1) (1960).
33. 296 U.S. 344 (1935).
34. Treas. Reg. J 301.7701-2(a) (1) (1965).
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does not exist.85 Although the regulations do not appear to contemplate
a corporate general partner, since the bankruptcy of any member of the
organization will cause the dissolution of the organization, 8 this possi-
bility of dissolution ought to preclude continuity of life. Even if the
partnership agreement provides that the business will be conducted by
the remaining members of the partnership in the event of the death or
withdrawal of any member, such a provision will not establish continuity
of life if death or withdrawal of a member will cause dissolution under
local law. Thus, there may be a dissolution of the organization and no
continuity of life even though the business is continued. 7
Under the Uniform Limited Partnership Act a dissolution will occur
unless all the members of the partnership consent to the continued opera-
tion of the business or the right to continue the business is stated in the
certificate of limited partnership.38 Therefore, unless a specific provision
is included in the partnership agreement, continuity of life will not exist.
Continuity of life may also be avoided by specifically including a pro-
vision permitting the organization to be terminated by any member at any
time. But all of this verbiage seems superfluous in light of the unequivocal
statement in the regulations that a limited partnership subject to a statute
corresponding to the Uniform Limited Partnership Act lacks continuity
of life.39
The corporate characteristic of free transferability of interest will be
avoided if the limited partnership agreement provides that no member
of the limited partnership can transfer his interest to a non-member un-
less all of the members consent to the transfer.40 Prevention of free trans-
ferability may also be accomplished by a provision requiring a limited
partner or his estate to sell the interest either to the general partner or to
the other limited partners, if such interest is to be sold at all.41 How-
ever, care must be taken to avoid a mandatory sale at death in order
to prevent bunching of income under section 706(c).42
Like continuity of life, then, the characteristic of free transferability
of interests is largely a matter of contract law and, according to the regu-
lations, if neither of these characteristics exists, the limited partnership
will be taxed as a partnership.43 But since the planner may want his entity
to have either free transferability of interests or continuity of life, the
characteristics of centralized management and limited liability will be
examined in order to provide maximum planning flexibility.
35. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(b) (1) (1965).
36. Id.
37. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(b) (2) (1965).
38. UN oRm LimrED PARSNmEsmp AcT § 20 (hereinafter cited as ULPA).
39. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(b) (3) (1965).
40. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(g) example 2 (1965).
41. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(e) (2) (1965).
42. See Treas. Reg. § 1.706-1(c) (3) (vi) example 2 (1956).
43. See note 32 supra and accompanying text.
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The regulations provide that in determining whether an organiza-
tion has centralized management, local law will govern." This raises a
difficult problem with respect to a limited partnership in states where the
Uniform Limited Partnership Act is in force since centralized manage-
ment generally becomes an issue when creditors of the partnership seek
to remove the protective cloak of limited liability from the limited part-
ners." The paucity of case law in this area virtually precludes predict-
ability and consequently renders the rule of Bosch v. Commissioner
inapplicable, especially in states where the issue has not arisen. The lim-
ited number of cases which have been decided should, however, give the
reader some sensitivity to the problems involved.
In Holzman v. De Escamilla7 there was a suit by a trustee in bank-
ruptcy of a limited partnership against the defendant and two limited
partners to determine if the limited partners were general partners for
the purposes of liability. The partnership was in the farming business;
the limited partners determined what crops would be planted. Perhaps
more significant is the fact that the checking accounts required the signa-
tures of any two of the three partners, limited or general. Thus, the
limited partners had absolute control over the expenditure of funds in
the business, because the general partner needed the signature of one of
the limited partners in order to draw a check, and therefore either of
the limited partners could effectively veto any expenditure by the general
partner. One would think that these two powers would be sufficient to
remove the cloak of limited liability from the two limited partners. In
addition, the limited partners forced the general partner to resign. The
court held that the limited partners had exercised sufficient control over
the business to be held liable as general partners.
Rathke v. Griffith explored the effect of reliance by a person seeking
to destroy the protection of a limited partnership. The limited partnership
agreement provided that the affairs of the partnership should be handled
by a three member group that bore a striking resemblance to a board of
directors. The defendant was elected to this "board," signed a lease for
the partnership, a power of attorney for the partnership along with the
general partners, and also signed two warranty deeds for the partnership.
The court held that since there was no reliance by the plaintiff on the
fact that the defendant appeared to be a general partner, the defendant
would not be categorized as a general partner.
Silvola v. Rowlett,"9 decided four years after Rathke, gives additional
44. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(c)(4) (1965) alludes to compliance with the Uniform
Limited Partnership Act.
45. ULPA § 7.
46. 387 U.S. 456 (1967) (Only the decision of the highest state court will be regarded
for federal tax purposes.)
47. 86 Cal. App. 2d 858, 195 P.2d 833 (1948).
48. 36 Wash. 2d 954, 218 P.2d 757 (1950).
49. 129 Colo. 522, 272 P.2d 287 (1954).
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insight into those acts of a limited partner which do not constitute control
of the business. The defendant, the limited partner, for a few months
acted as foreman of the general partner's auto repair shop. The general
partner had sole control of the bank account, made all deposits, secured
all loans, executed all chattel mortgages in connection with the business
and was the only one authorized to draw on the checking account. The
court held that sufficient control over the management of the business had
not been exercised by the limited partner to categorize him as a general
partner.
Grainger v. Antoyan50 offers a few more characteristics which do not
brand the limited partner with the "control taint." In 1950, the defendant
became sales manager of an auto concern; he had no authority to employ
or discharge personnel or to accept trade-ins on cars, unless the trade-
ins complied with a specific, fixed formula. In 1951, he was authorized
to co-sign checks. However, this was only allowed when his employer was
out of town. Additionally, he had no authority regarding the service
department. Shortly thereafter, he became a limited partner in the busi-
ness, and later, as a result of an amendment to the limited partnership
agreement, was required to contribute $1,000 to the partnership. At no
time did the defendant have control over the extension of credit. The
court held that there was no control and hence no unlimited liability
with respect to the limited partner.
In another case, a limited partnership agreement provided that the
general partner could exercise various financial powers only when he
acted jointly with the general sales manager of the partnership. The
father of the beneficiaries of a trust was the general sales manager;
the trustees of the trust were limited partners in the partnership. If
the general sales manager's employment was terminated, the trustees
were required to sell their interest to other limited partners. The court
rejected the contention that because the trust beneficiaries were the
children of the general sales manager, the trustees were general partners.
Although the case does not clearly so state, it suggests that for the pur-
poses of state law, a limited partner cannot become a general partner
by some form of attribution. 51
The most recent case dealing with the area of "control" is Vulcan
Furniture Manufacturing Corp. v. Vaughn.5" In this case, a limited
partnership consisted of two general partners and one limited partner.
One of the general partners died and the other general partner purchased
his interest. The partnership failed to renew the limited partnership cer-
tificate on the death of a partner, as required by state law.53 Plaintiff
argued that the failure to renew the certificate caused the limited part-
S0. 48 Cal. 2d 805, 313 P.2d 848 (1957).
51. Plasteel Prod. Corp. v. Holman, 271 F.2d 354 (1st Cir. 1959).
52. 168 So.2d 760 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1964).
53. FA. STAT. § 620.31 (1969).
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nership to become a general partnership, rendering the defendant limited
partner liable as a general partner. The court held that a de facto limited
partnership existed, analogizing it to the situation where a de jure cor-
poration becomes a de facto corporation for failure to file an annual
report and pay a corporate stock tax. One can only speculate as to
whether the doctrine of "de facto limited partnerships" is a valid one.
However, since the defendant exercised no control over management, the
court had little alternative if it wanted to prevent unlimited personal
liability.
If there are no potential problems under state law, the regulations
provide that centralized management means a concentration of continuing
exclusive authority to make independent business decisions on behalf
of the organization which do not require ratification by members
of the organization.54 Centralized management will not exist when the
centralized authority is merely to perform ministerial acts as an agent
at the direction of a principal.55 This statement should negate the impact
of the BNA Tidbit release concerning the stock ownership limitations,
since the greater the number of limited partners who are officers, directors
or stockholders of the general partner, the more diffuse the management
becomes. By attempting to minimize the participation of limited partners
in the corporate general partner, the Service is defying its own regula-
tions. Logically, its position should be that unless participation in man-
agement exceeds a certain percentage,50 centralized management will exist.
Such a position would be consistent with I.R.S. regulations.
The examples in the regulations lend credence to the foregoing con-
tention and consequently offer suggestions for planners. Centralized man-
agement does not exist if the agreement provides that management of the
organization be vested exclusively in an executive committee of four mem-
bers elected by all the members of the organization, because the agree-
ment will not be effective against outsiders who had no notice of it.5
However, centralized management will exist if, under local law, no one
acting without the authority of the committee has the power to bind the
organization by his acts.5" If the elected officers of an organization per.
form only ministerial functions such as presiding at meetings and carry-
ing out the directions of the members, centralized management does not
exist.59 If the general partner has exclusive authority to manage the af-
fairs of the organization, but can only act with the unanimous consent of
all of the members, centralized management does not exist.60
54. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(c) (3) (1965).
55. Id.
56. The 80% test of INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 368(c) is suggested since the issue of
control by limited partners of the general partner is analogous to the areas where control
arises in Sub-chapter C.
57. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(g) example 2 (1965).
58. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(g) example 5 (1965).
59. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(c) (3) (1965).
60. Id.
1971]
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
Since the management of the limited partnership might be im-
paired if the corporate general partner is required to obtain approval
of the limited partners before performing any managerial functions, it is
suggested that the limited partnership agreement state that the corporate
general partner has exclusive control over the day-to-day affairs of the
organization but must obtain the approval of a high percentage of the
limited partners in order to perform stated functions such as borrowing
money or mortgaging property. Such a construction should still prevent
centralized management.
The theory behind the regulation dealing with centralized manage-
ment appears to be that the more concentrated management becomes in
a relatively small group of members of the organization, the more closely
that group resembles a corporate board of directors. As a consequence,
the management characteristic is more emblematic of a corporation than
of a partnership. Strangely enough, there are inherent and illogical con-
tradictions in the regulations. For example, the regulations provide that
limited partnerships corresponding to the Uniform Limited Partnership
Act generally do not have centralized management unless substantially
all of the interests (presumably proprietary interests) are owned by the
limited partners."' It has been shown that just the opposite is true. A
limited partnership subject to the Uniform Limited Partnership Act will
not have centralized management as long as substantially all of the inter-
ests are owned by the limited partners.1
2
Since centralized management tends to disappear as the number of
limited partners taking part in management increases, the proposed use
of the attribution rules of section 31811 is deleterious to the Service's
already ill-conceived opinion and ought not to be regarded as a threat
to the planner.
With respect to the limited liability, the regulations provide that
personal liability will not exist with respect to the general partner when
he has no substantial assets other than his interest in the partnership
which could be reached by a creditor of the organization.' This state-
ment contradicts the net worth test suggested in the BNA releases65 in
that there is no correlation between the net worth of a corporation and
its capital interest in the limited partnership.
Assume that corporation X has assets of $25,000,000, liabilities
of $23,000,000 and a net worth of $2,000,000. Corporation Y has assets
of $2,000,000, liabilities of $1,000,000 and a net worth of $1,000,000. If
in the alternative, each was the general partner in a limited partnership
capitalized at $20,000,000, corporation X would pass the IRS test while
corporation Y would not. Yet, from a creditor's perspective, a borrower
61. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(c) (4) (1965).
62. See notes 47 and 53, supra.
63. See note 26, supra.
64. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(d) (2) (1965).
65. See notes 27 and 28, supra.
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with a net worth equal to 50 percent of assets is far more desirable
than a borrower whose net worth equals eight percent of its assets. If
the Service chooses to be the paladin of the limited partnership's credi-
tors, logic dictates that since the general partner is personally liable, the
corporation's balance sheet should be analyzed independently of the cap-
italization of the partnership.
The examples in the regulations suggest that this was what the
Service had initially considered. In one example, the general partners con-
tributed a total of $150,000 to a limited partnership whose total capital-
ization was $5,150,000. But since the facts alluded to the general partners
having sufficient means to satisfy the obligations of the organization, no
limited liability was held to exist.6 In a second example, the general part-
ners contributed a total of $300,000 to a limited partnership capitalized
at $5,300,000 but since the general partners were personally capable of
assuming substantial obligations of the organization, no limited liability
existed." Looking to the assets of the general partners, the examples con-
cluded that contributions to the limited partnership of 2.9 percent and
5.6 percent of the total capitalization of the limited partnership was suf-
ficient to protect the claims of creditors; no mention was made of the
respective net worths of the general partners with respect to the capital-
ization of each partnership.
The regulations suggest tests other than the net worth test. If the
general partner is merely an agent of the limited partners, then personal
liability exists with respect to the limited partners,6 but will not exist
with respect to the general partner when acting as the agent of the limited
partners.6 9 These two rules suggest that a limited partnership, whose gen-
eral partner purportedly has unlimited liability, will be converted into a
limited partnership with the limited partners having unlimited liability.
In either event, however, at least one member of the organization will be
personally liable to creditors and, consequently, unlimited liability must
exist in a limited partnership.
It has been shown that if the limited partners exercise too much con-
trol in the management of the corporate general partner, and hence in the
partnership, the limited partners will no longer enjoy limited liability
under state law.7" A cross indemnity agreement between the corporate
general partner and the limited partners, or perhaps a triangular indem-
nity agreement if there is also an individual general partner, will protect
the individuals and still not destroy the unlimited liability traditionally
inuring to the general partner.
7
1
66. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-3(b)(2) example 2 (1960).
67. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-3(b) (2) example 1 (1960).
68. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(d) (2) (1960).
69. id.
70. See notes 45, 47-53, supra.
71. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(d) (1) (1960).
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V. POSSIBLE PLANNING TECHNIQUES
Basically, five possibilities exist regarding the organization of a lim-
ited partnership with a corporate general partner. Each of these options
will be discussed in light of potential IRS attacks, with suggestions as to
how to best avoid unfavorable Service reaction.
(1) Assume that all of the limited partners are stockholders, direc-
tors or officers of the corporate general partner and that the general
partner has no officers, directors or stockholders who are not limited
partners. Since it has been shown that the Service's unofficial position
cannot withstand the scrutiny of both logic and the regulations, the
only avenue of attack available to the Service is that the entire entity
is a sham. It could be argued that the limited partnership is a sham and
that all of the limited partners are to be considered stockholders of the
corporate general partner. The net effect would be that all of the profits
and losses of the limited partnership, regardless of any contractual
allocation of the partnership agreement, would be attributed to the cor-
poration. This type of attack would be most telling when tax shelters
are available to the limited partners as partners, but not as stockholders
of the corporate general partner.
If, in the alternative, the Service argued that the corporate general
partner was a sham, the limited partnership would be treated as a corpo-
ration and the limited partners would be regarded as stockholders;
the ensuing tax consequences would be the same as previously discussed.
The third option available to the Service is to permit the entity
to remain intact, but to treat the limited partnership as a corporation
and the corporate general partner as a subsidiary. In the opinion of the
author, this ploy would impose a triple tax on the limited partner-stock-
holders. Each limited partner would be taxed as a stockholder of the
limited partnership; the corporate general partner would be taxed as a
stockholder; and the stockholders of the corporation, who are the
limited partners, would be taxed as stockholders of the subsidiary cor-
porate general partner.
In attempting to thwart any of the above attacks, the planner has
one of two options. He can rely on logic and the regulations, or he can
rely on case law. It has already been shown that if the partnership agree-
ment expressly negates two of the four corporate characteristics men-
tioned in the regulations, the entity should be taxed as a partnership. The
characteristics to be avoided will depend on the needs of the planner
and his clients. However, if the planner wishes to create continuity of
life or free transferability of interests at the expense of centralized
management, care should be taken to avoid the establishment of small
executive or management committees. If the need for flexibility requires
the existence of these committees, the corporate by-laws should ex-
pressly comply with the examples cited in the regulations.7"
72. Treas. Reg. I 301.7701-2(g) examples 2-7 (1965).
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Since the Service apparently intends to disregard its own regulations,
the achilles heel of the sham argument lies in a single case, C. W. King-
bay.7" In that case, the petitioner and his wife formed a limited partner-
ship with a corporate general partner, Kingbay Properties, Inc. The
articles of limited partnership required each limited partner, i.e., the peti-
tioner and his wife, to contribute $100.00, and additional contributions of
cash or other property were permitted. Profits and losses were to be
shared in the ratio of capital contributions and the business of the part-
nership was to be managed by the corporate general partner. The corpor-
ation had capitalization of $1,000.00, which was contributed by the
petitioner, who was the president of the corporation. His wife was
secretary-treasurer.
The limited partnership was formed for the purpose of constructing
apartment buildings. In April, 1959, three months after the partnership
was formed, the articles were amended to require the general partner to
become a limited partner and to contribute $100.00. The petitioner and
his wife each contributed an additional $2,450.00. Their contributions in
subsequent years were as follows:
1962-contributions of each totalled $ 8,450.00
1963-contributions of each totalled $19,450.00 (cumulative)
1964-contributions of each totalled $29,950.00 (cumulative)
In 1958, 1959 and 1960, the partnership purchased land and con-
structed apartments. Although the partnership was the purchaser and
owner of the land and buildings, the mortgage deeds and notes were ex-
ecuted by the general partner in order to obtain financing for the build-
ings. There was no disclosure in the notes or mortgage deeds that the
limited partnership owned the properties. As of December 31, 1959, the
outstanding mortgages were $240,134.62; one year later the mortgages
had increased to $832,698.36.
During the period between 1958 and 1960, the petitioner made the




most of which were repaid as follows:
1959-$259,842.40
1960-$690,861.35
These loans were carried on the books of the corporation as current lia-
bilities and were treated in a similar way on the returns filed with the IRS.
From these facts, it should be apparent that many of the elements
of a sham were present. The corporate general partner was grossly under-
capitalized in that it had initial capital of $1,000.00 while holding prop-
73. 46 T.C. 147 (1966).
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erty subject to mortgages of over $800,000.00, and having borrowed over
$1,000,000.00 from one of its two stockholders who happened to be hus-
band and wife. The general partner was completely controlled by the lim-
ited partners. Moreover, neither of the limited partners was personally
liable for any of the debts, and the general partner could not be personally
liable because the debts were secured by land and buildings. Apparently,
the sole purpose behind the structure of the Kingbay organization was
the minimization of taxes. However, the Service refused to attack the
entity. Instead, the Service successfully defended the entity from an
attack by its creators. Had the corporate shell been disregarded, as the
taxpayers argued it should have been, then the individual stockholders,
not the corporation, would have owned the mortgaged property. Section
752 (c) provides that when property is subject to liabilities, those liabili-
ties are treated as liabilities of the owners of the property. Since the part-
ners would have owned the property as individuals, the liabilities would
have "belonged" to them. Although a limited partner cannot increase his
basis by assuming liabilities which would exceed his basis, the regulations
do permit a limited partner to increase his basis if he owns property sub-
ject to a liability.74 Had the taxpayers prevailed in the Tax Court, the
corporate shell would have been disregarded and their bases would have
been increased sufficiently to absorb the losses of the limited partnership.
The losses then could have been used to offset $22,493.40 of non-
partnership income.
In effect, the thrust of the IRS argument was that the corporate
entity must be respected; the limited partnership must be respected; and
the limited partners and stockholders must be treated separately for tax
purposes, notwithstanding the fact that the limited partners and stock-
holders are the same individuals.
Evidently, the Service failed to attack a sham solely because to do
so would have produced less revenue than to have sustained the sham.
However, it is conceivable that had the Kingbay entity been passing ac-
celerated depreciation on to the limited partners, while retaining the earn-
ings of the real estate operation in the corporation, the Service would
have contended that the taxpayers had constructed an egregious sham
solely for the purpose of avoiding taxes. An equally interesting question
is how Kingbay would have been treated under the ULPA. Since the
limited partners exercised considerable control over the general partner,
section 7 of the ULPA might be invoked to convert the limited partners
into general partners, at which point there would be neither limited
liability nor centralized management. Therefore, it appears that an entity
similar to Kingbay is almost impervious to the sham argument should
the Service choose to litigate. But the planner must be warned that
Kingbay does not grant his entity immunity from attack; the case only
offers a defense.
(2) When all of the limited partners are stockholders but not all of
74. Treas. Reg. § 1.752-1(e) (1956).
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the stockholders are limited partners, the rules applicable to situation (1)
should apply since the only variable is the existence of non-limited partner
stockholders, and these individuals will be taxed as stockholders regard-
less of how the Service attacks the limited partnership.
(3) When all of the stockholders are limited partners but not all of
the limited partners are stockholders, the success of any IRS attack will
depend on the relative number of limited partners running the general
partner. The smaller the percentage of limited partners who are stock-
holders, the greater the chances of centralized management existing. An
additional problem arises with respect to the limited partners who are
not stockholders if centralized management does exist, and as a conse-
quence thereof, the limited partnership has more corporate character-
istics than noncorporate ones. The partnership will then be taxed as a cor-
poration and the limited partners who are not stockholders will be taxed as
stockholders even though they are not deriving the same benefits as the
limited partners who are stockholders. This can be avoided by negating
either centralized management or two of the other corporate character-
istics mentioned above.
(4) When only some of the limited partners are stockholders and only
some of the stockholders are limited partners, the tax consequences
should be analogous to those occurring when all of the stockholders are
limited partners but not all of the limited partners are stockholders.
(5) When none of the limited partners is a stockholder, the planner
will have complied with the Service's unofficial position and should have
nothing to fear.
VI. CONCLUSION
Presently, the only certain way for a limited partnership with a
corporate general partner to be taxed as a partnership is compliance with
the criteria mentioned in the BNA releases. The planner must be advised
that non-compliance with the "Tidbits" is an invitation to litigation
which ought to be accepted, if at all, only when the circumstances are
such as to insure the greatest possibility of victory. However, the tax
practitioner who is confronted with an already existing limited partner-
ship with a corporate general partner has no alternative with respect to
planning and must posit those arguments which would best serve the
interests of his client. Specifically, the criteria articulated in the "Tid-
bits" will not withstand the scrutiny of logic. In addition, the taxpayer
ought not to be penalized as a result of his adherence to the rules set
forth in the regulations. Lastly, assuming that the Internal Revenue Ser-
vice relies on the sham argument, the Service's position should logically
fail in that the limited partnership with a corporate general partner
would then be converted into a general partnership which would lack
both centralized management and limited liability under state law.
75
75. See note 4, supra.
